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Abstract
Death spiral convertibles, are a type of loan lenders give to a firm in exchange for a right
to convert into equity at below market prices. This differs from traditional convertibles because
there is no fixed conversion price. Instead, the price can be reset lower if the firm's stock price
falls below the conversion price at the time of issuance. As the process repeats itself the stock's
price spirals downwards. This process benefits the bondholders at the cost of the shareholders.
Based on a hand collected sample of 23 companies issuing a total of I 97 floating price
convertibles, the stock price declined an average of 62.04% from the first issuance to the last
issuance of a floating price convertible. On average the companies on our sample issued their
first floating price convertible within one year of IPO. Companies that saw the greatest decline
in stock price shared two important factors. First, their total floating price convertibles issued
was over$ I million. Second, they issued more than five floating price convertibles. Despite the
floating price convertibles having negative effects on a company's stock price in general, the
funds can keep the company alive. Three out of the 23 companies in our sample saw their stock
price increase from the time of the first issuance to the last issuance of a floating price
convertible.
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Introduction

Death spiral convertibles or floating price convertible bonds (FPCs) are structured private
investment in public equity (PIPE) deals. PIPEs are a way for finns to raise capital by
exchanging equity for funds. The two kinds of PIPE deals are structured and traditional. A
traditional PIPE lets investors purchase stock at predetennined conversion ratios. However. a
structured PIPE allows investors to purchase stock of a company at below market prices, via a
variable conversion discount. If the company's stock price goes down, the investor can still get
it at discount which protects the investor from downside risk.
A floating price convertible is the name of a debt instrument that falls under the category
of structured PIPEs. This debt instrument is fascinating because it is essentially a riskless
investment for the buyer of the FPC. Unlike a fixed convertible, the buyer can always convert
their stock at a discount from the market price. Fixed convertibles do not offer such discounts on
stock price, and instead the buyer can only convert their bond into stock at a conversion rate
specified by the issuing company. For example, if the stock is trading at $1 the buyer can only
convert once the stock goes above $1. On the other hand, with FPCs if the stock is trading at $2
they can get it for $1; if it's trading at $.01 they can get it for $.005, and so on. No matter what
price the stock is trading at the buyer can always "buy low and sell high." This discount can
have a negative impact on a company's stock price because the buyers of these bonds can get
massive amounts of shares upon conversion. The increase in the number of shares from the
conversion causes dilution, which makes other stockholders' shares less valuable because they
will own a smaller percentage of the company. The buyers then short sell the company and cover
their shorts with discounted stock. This short selling further drops the stock price and causes the
death spiral. The name "death spiral" comes from the decline in stock price and increased

I

dilution among companies that issue FPCs. Figure 1, from Bloomberg news, shows how the
death spiral process works.
Figure I
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Based off of a hand collected sample of 23 companies issuing a total of 197 FPCs we
found an average stock price decline of 62.04% from the first issuance to the last issuance of an
FPC. Companies that saw the greatest decline in stock price shared two important factors. First,
their total FPC debt issued was over $1 million. Second, they issued more than five FPCs.
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Background

In March 2015, an article was written on Bloomberg Business week about a young
immigrant making millions of dollars from penny stocks (Faux, 2015}. What made this
individual, Joshua Sason, unique compared to a typical penny stock trader is that he was not
trading penny stocks, he was financing them. Penny stocks are known to be very risky, the SEC
states that "investors in penny stocks should be prepared for the possibility that they may lose
their whole investment 1 ." According to the Bloomberg article, 71 out of the 80 companies
Sason had done business with had significant decreases in their stock price (Faux, 2015}.
Despite this, Sason still found a way to make millions of dollars without exposing himself to
substantial risk.
The debt instrument Sason uses to finance struggling penny stock companies is called a
death spiral convertible or more fonnally, a FPC. A typical convertible bond lets investors
convert their bond into a company's stock at a fixed conversion price. For example, Investor
"A" buys a hundred $1,000 face value convertible bonds from "XYZ Corp" which are
convertible into 10,000 shares of XYZ Corp's stock, mature in 5 years, and have a 6% interest
rate. At the end of the maturity, Investor A can get the face value of the bond, $1,000, plus an
extra 6% in interest for total proceeds of$106,000 ($1,000*100bonds*106%}. However, ifXYZ
Corp's stock price goes up to $12 then Investor A can convert his bond into the 10,000 shares of
XYZ Corp's stock at $12 a share, therefore yielding proceeds of$120,000 (10,000shares*$12}.
Investor A would not want to convert his bond into stock ifXYZ Corp's share price was $9
because his shares would be worth $90,000 ($9*10,000shares) which is a loss of $100 per bond.

1

Accessed at https:ljwww.sec.gov/investor/schedule1Sg.htm 4/2017
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What makes FPCs different than typical convertible bonds is that investors get a discount
on the company's stock whether it goes down, up, or if the company cannot even pay back the
principal. Say Investor A buys FPCs from XYZ Corp worth $100,000, mature in five years,
carry a 6% interest rate, are convertible into XYZ Corp's stock at a 50% discount, and Investor
A can convert six months after the issuance of the FPC. Iflnvestor A waits five years he will get
the same return as in the previous example, $106,000. However, Investor A does not really want
to wait five years to make a 6% return, instead he wants the stock price to go down and actually
begins to short it after the six months goes by. For the sake of this example let's say XYZ
Corp's stock is trading at $1 per share. After Investor A's short selling, the stock goes down to
$.80. Investor A converts $50,000 into stock at a 50% discount at $.40 for a total of 125,000
shares ($50,000/$.4). Investor A then immediately sells his 125,000 shares at the current price of
$.8 for total proceeds of $100,000 (125,000shares *$.8). Investor A's selling causes the share
price to go down to $.5. Investor A converts $30,000 into shares at a 50% discount, $.25 a share
for 120,000 shares ($30,000/$.25). Investor A then immediately sells at the current price of$.5
for proceeds of $60,000 (120,000shares*$.5). This final sale causes XYZ Corp's stock to
decrease down to $.01. Investor A converts the last $20,000 at a 50% discount, $.005 a share for
4,000,000 shares ($20,000/$.005). Then Investor A immediately sells the 4,000,000 shares at the
current price of$.Ol for proceeds of$40,000 (4,000,000shares*$.Ol). In total, Investor A has
made total proceeds of $200,000 and doubled his profit in less than a year.
When markets are efficient investors have to sustain a given amount of risk for a given
return. However, FPCs offer very low risk for investors and still yield high returns. The average
discount in our sample was 55.43%. The only risk investors face is that there will not be enough
liquidity for them to sell off their discounted stock. However, according to Faux (2005),
4

investors like Joshua Sason make sure that the companies they invest in have substantial liquidity
before they lend them money (Faux, 2005).
Faux gives an example of this liquidity seeking by referring to Paul Riss, an entrepreneur
creating a communications app called Pervasip to compete with Skype. Pervasip was down to its
last $100,000 when Sason's company, Magna, contacted it asking if it needed cash. Riss stated
that when he was contacted by Magna all they cared about was the liquidity of the stock, "they
want to see how many dollars are traded each month." Riss went on to say that Magna did not
even ask one question about the app itself (Faux, 2005). Typically, investors care more about the
product or service they're investing in and its potential for growth. However, as seen in the
Pervasip example, before lending a company money, companies like Magna want to make sure
there is enough liquidity within the stock so they can dump their shares.
The effect FPCs can have on a companies' stock price is detrimental. One of the
companies in the data we collected, Maryjane Group (MJMJ), saw this first hand. Maryjane
Group operates in the canna-hospitality sector, an industry they have claimed to pioneer
themselves.2 Maryjane Group runs two Bud and Breakfast locations in Colorado and provides
consumers with cannabis friendly lodges to relax in. The company issued its first floating price
convertible on August 8, 2014. The value of the FPC was $61,600 and matured on February 13,
2016. In addition, the note carried an 8% interest rate and gave the buyer, JDF Capital Inc a 61%
discount on the lowest daily average price 20 days before the conversion.
At the time ofMJMJ's deal with JDF Capital, MJMJ's stock price was trading at $.25.
At the time of MJMJ's last issuance of an FPC on December 23, 2015, the stock was trading at

2

Accessed at http:llthemaryjanegrJH.cmJL 3/2017
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$.0002. MJMJ ended up issuing 22 FPC's totaling over $1.5 million from August 2014 through
December 2015. The average interest rate these notes carried was 8.65% which is lower than the
total sample average of 9.74%. In addition, MJMJ's average discount of 51.52% was also lower
than our sample average of 55.43%. Despite MJMJ's average discount and interest rate being
lower than our sample's average discount and interest rate, MJMJ's stock price still saw a
massive decline. MJMJ's massive stock price decline is not unusual for companies issuing FPCs
and all but three of the companies in our sample saw decreases in stock price from the time of
the first issuance, to the last issuance of an FPC.
Literature Review

The first known research on death spiral convertibles was done by Hillian and Vermaelen
(2001). From 1995 to 1998, they collected 487 issues of floating price convertibles from 277
firms. By December 31, 1999, only 144 of the 277 firms were still listed. The causes for the 133
firms to be de-listed were either from bankruptcy, takeover, failure to meet minimum share price,
minimum float, or minimum equity due to the effects of floating price convertibles (Hillion &
Vermaelen, 2001). Hillion and Vermaelen (2001) also found that investors who bought common
stocks in companies that issue floating price convertibles lost, on average, 34% of their
investment a year after the issue. In addition, in 85% of the cases the one year post
announcement returns were negative. What makes this majority of negative returns surprising is
that it was during one of the strongest bull markets in U.S. history.
Since floorless convertibles are private placements, they are not covered by typical data
sources. As a result, Hillion and Vermaelen (2001) used the SEC-Edgar database to gather and
analyze S-3 and 8-K filings. They found that over the course of four years there was on average,
15 issues of floating price convertibles a month. The sectors with the most issues were
6

technology and medical, which counted for 50% of the total 277 firms analyzed. The average
stock price of these firms at the time of the issuance of floating price convertibles was $5.125
(Hillion & Vermaelen, 2001). Furthermore, 85% of firms experienced negative returns the year
after the issue of floating price convertible bonds. In addition, companies that had multiple
issuances saw their stock price decline 50% the year after the issuance.
When an investor acquires a floating price convertible bond the average waiting time till
he/she can convert is 86 calendar days. In addition, the value of the convertibles was 92% more
than the cash given by the investor. The average stock price discount given to investors was,
20%, however it reached almost 50% in some cases. This significant discount makes the
floorless convertible a great instrument for short selling. In traditional short selling the investor
has to repurchase shares to close his/her position, however, this can be very risky with low
liquidity stocks. Floorless/floating price convertible bond holders avoid this risk because the
bond can always be converted at a discount of the lowest trading price, thus yielding the holder
more shares of the stock from the company (Hillion & Vermalen, 2001). Despite the assumption
bond holders would short the stock, only 58 cases out of 487 issues had offer prospectuses that
prohibited short selling of the company's stock. Surprisingly, in 409 cases the holder was
explicitly told he/she could short sell. However, FPCs can be helpful for small risky firms that
can't receive any other sort of financing. The best way for a company to minimize their risk of
being delisted while issuing floorless convertibles is to reduce the discount percentage (Hillion &
Vermaelen, 2001).
Floating price convertibles give investors the option to either take wealth from other
shareholders, and/or gain voting control of the firm. Since short selling often goes with FPCs,
firms can refuse to honor an investor's conversion request, however it exposes the firm to the
7

accusation that it breached a contract (Finnerty, 2005). The issuing finn most likely already has
monetary trouble, hence the decision to issue FPCs, so the finn may not have enough cash to
even consider getting into a legal battle with a lender.
According to McClearn (2002), Houston lawyer, Wes Christian, states that death spiral
financing rings work by scanning the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board for vulnerable companies
with high volume. The liquidity and float of the target company are taken into mind so the
lenders can see how much they can pump and dump the stock. Christian says that once the lender
promises to go through with the lending deal; the death spiral ring begins to short sell the
company's shares (McCleam, 2002). As the stock price goes down, Christian says the lender
may say "We're gonna stick with you buddy. We're in it for the long haul." Going further with
the example, Christian says the lender may say "We're going to loan you $3 million during the
first tranche, and $25 million on the second tranche. But, incidentally, we're not going to give
you that second tranche if your stock falls below $1.50 (the stock price is trading at $7 per
share)." With this in mind, Christian states that the company may think to itself, "Hell, it ain't
going below $1.50 - not with this money behind it." However, the death spiral financing ring
continues to short the stock so they can be off the hook $25 million. Christian says, "Rarely
have they funded the second tranche."
According to McCleam (2002), Brian Overstreet, a private placement expert and
president of San Diego-based PCS Research Technology Inc. states that "Once the stock starts
trending down, a lot of people jump on the bandwagon, and it can get real ugly real fast." As the
stock price begins to decline the lenders begin to demand conversions to use their discounted
shares to cover their short positions, thus leading to the imminent death spiral phenomenon
(McClearn, 2002). Christian suspects the money from the first trance actually comes from the
8

lenders short selling profits, saying that "They frigging lend you your own money!" Overstreet
states that victims of death spiral deals who try to bring their case to court "Have a tough time
coming into a courtroom and claiming to be a clean-hands defendant." In addition, Overstreet
says, "More often than not, the issuer knows that they're getting into bed with someone of lesser
stature than Goldman Sachs or another top-tier brokerage. Yeah, they may have screwed you, but
you probably knew it was coming."
Hoffer (20 I 0) states that the SEC is too strict in regards to cracking down on PIPE
transactions. PIPE transactions can be very helpful to small companies that desperately need
cash. A PIPE deal can give that small company enough cash to push its idea forward. Hoffer
acknowledges the death spiral phenomenon associated with FPCs, but states that these debt
instruments have become less popular since the late 1990s. The decline in death spiral
convertibles is due to increased competition among hedge funds which gives PIPE issuers better
deals, increased SEC scrutiny of PIPE deals, and increased awareness among PIPE issuers of the
dangers ofFPCs (Hoffer, 2010).
Floating price convertibles are PIPE deals, private investment in public equity. A
traditional PIPE has a fixed conversion price, however, a structured PIPE has variable
conversion rates. Structured PIPEs give investors the incentive to short the PIPE issuing firm's
stock during the conversion period to redeem their convertibles for more shares (Brophy,
Oumiet, & Sialm, 2004). The SEC warns against structured PIPEs stating it encourages
investors "to engage in manipulative short selling of the issuer's stock in order to receive more
shares.3" Companies issuing traditional PIPEs tend to see better long term stock prices than

3 Accessed

at https://www.sec.gov/newsferess/2003-26.htm 3/27/2017
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companies that issue structured PIPEs. During the following year of issuing a traditional PIPE a
finn sees a return of -8.4%. However, during the following year of issuing a structured PIPE a
firm sees a return of -30.6% (Brophy, Oumiet, & Sialm, 2004). Institutional investors primarily
purchase traditional PIPEs, while hedge funds purchase 72% of structured PIPEs (Brophy,
Oumiet, & Sialm, 2004). The type of companies issuing structured PIPEs have fewer assets,
lower book to market ratios, and lower leverage than companies issuing traditional PIPEs. This
makes it a lot harder for these firms to receive traditional financing such as bank loans, makes
them tum to structured pipes as they are the only way to finance their operations.

Floating price convertible bonds are private placements in public equity which makes
them very hard to find on traditional databases such as Bloomberg Terminal or Mergent. In
order to find our data we had to hand collect it. This approach involved using Google by
searching for companies issuing floating price convertible bonds. By simply typing in different
variances of"companies issuing floating price convertible bonds" into Google we were able to
look through message boards such as Investorhub.com and see if users commented whether a
company was issuing FPCs. After we found a company a user mentioned doing such type of
financing, we then looked through that company's 10-Ks on the SEC-Edgar database to see if the
company was actually issuing FPCs.
Once we confirmed that a company was issuing FPCs we looked at the details of the FPC
written in the 10-k. These details were the conversion discount, interest rate, issue date, maturity
date, and the dollar value of the FPC. We then used Nasdaq.com, Google Finance, and Yahoo
Finance to look at the stock price of each company at the time of each FPC issuance, number of
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conversations on Yahoo Finance, whether there was insider trading, and how long it took a
company to issue its first FPC (IPO to first issuance).
We ended up collecting a sample of 197 FPC issuances from 23 companies from 2009 to
2016 and a total amount ofFPC debt totaling to $29,589,735. Hand collecting the data took very
long and in Hillion and Vermalen's (2001) research they were able to collect 487 issuances from
287 companies because they had three years to collect data. In our case we only had about one
school semester.
According to Table I, the conversion discounts ranged from 15% to 90%, with a standard
deviation of 15.44%, and an average discount of 55.43%. On average, buyers of the FPCs in our
Table 1
Sumnmy Statistics: Floating Price Convertible Boms
Min
Max
Mean
Median Std Dev
90%
55.43%
50%
12.97%
Discount
15%
4.23%
36%
0%
8%
9.74%
Interest Rate
Value per FPC $145,048 $52,750 $ 354,016 $3,000 $3,000,000
sample were getting a company's stock at half the price upon conversion of the FPC and in some
cases even 10%. Hillion and Vermaelen's (2001) average discount in their sample was 20%.
The highest discount they found was 48%. This was surprising for us because we thought
increased competition among lenders would lower discount rates as stated by Hoffer (20 I 0).
However, our average discount was higher than Hillion and Vermaelen's (2001) highest
discount. According to their study, the higher the discount, the worse a firm's share price
performed over time. In Million and Vermaelen' s (200 I) study their average stock price decline
was 34%. In our study it was 62.04% as seen in Table 2.
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Table 2
Sumnmy Stamtics: Floating Price Convertible Bonds
Avg Stock Price Decline
62.04%
Avg Conversations on Yah>o
320
Avg Years Since IPO
I
Total Atrount ofFPC Debt
$ 29,589,735
The average interest rate carried on the FPCs was 9.74% which is very high considering
that the Fed Funds rate has stayed below 1% during the time frame of the data collected in our
sample. The highest interest rate was 36% and the lowest was 0%. Our hypothesis on why a
company would issue a 0% interest rate bond is because they never planned on paying it back
and knew the buyer of the bond would end up converting the bond into discounted shares.
Out of the 23 companies in our sample 19 issued FPCs within one year of their IPO,
suggesting that these companies may have a hard time receiving debt funds from banks.
Furthermore, on average, the stock prices of the companies in our sample declined 62% from the
issuance of their first FPC to the last issuance of an FPC. The largest decline in stock price was
100%, while the highest increase was 34.18% as seen in Table 3. The industries ranged from
mining to beverages, however, some of the more common ones were cigarettes, prepackaged
software, and business services as seen in Table 2. We did not include the price change for Flasr
Inc because they issued their FPCs only within a couple weeks of each other. We did not think
this would be enough time to see the effects of the FPC on the stock price. In addition, we did
not include stock price decline for firms that only issued one FPC because we were only looking
at the stock price from first issuance to last issuance. It is important to note that only three
companies in our sample had positive returns from the time of the first issuance of an FPC to the
last. Hence, maybe the FPC' s gave enough money to the company to invest in cash generating
projects.
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Table 3
Iooividual Company lnfunnation

Company Name
MwyJane Group
SunPeaks Ventures

Bioheart

FBEC Worldwide
Carmasys Inc
CoroWare Inc
SeanieMac Intl LTD
Breathe Ecig Corp
Jammin Java Corp
DTS8 Coffee Company
Medifirst Solutions
lnvestview Inc
Progreen US Inc
Pocket Games loc
Flasr Inc
Ascent Solar Teclmologies
Boldmce Group
Terra Tech Corp
Bemax lnc
Labor Smart Inc
Intelligent Highway Solutions
Greenfield Fanm Inc

Stock
Number Price
Avg
Total FPC
oflsstes Change Discomt Debt
23 -100% 51.52% $ 1 ,652,971
5 -93.33%
80% $ 2,765,000
24 -99.26%
51% $ 1,663,337
1 8 -99.25%
47% $ 1,134,683
8 -34.48%
52% $
596,655
52% $ 1,913,944
26 -95.83%
5 -83.33%
45% $
874,335
1 5 -98.45%
53% $ 1 ,967,263
4 -23.73%
63% $ 1,679,000
4
15%
62% $
547,000
7 -98.57%
271,000
55% $
5 -84.56%
59% $ 2,062,121
576,000
3 -65.83%
61% $
3 34.18%
124,000
58% $
42% $
341,350
6
I
80% $ 2,800,000
1
90% $ 1 ,500,000
2 15.79%
69% $ 3,825,000
1
48% $
40,000
17 -44.44%
57% $ 2,126,750
2
48% $ 639,026
16 -98.63%
44% $ 436,300

lrxlustry
Amusement and recreation
Metal mining
Physical and biological research
Beverages
Business services
Prepackaged software
Communication services
Cigarettes
Food preparations
Groceries
Cigarettes
Business services
Real Estate
Prepackaged software
Plastic products
Semicorxlu::tors
Business services
Engires arxl Turbines
Converted paper
Help supply services
Communication equipment
Agricultural erod-livestock

Despite the overall negative effects ofFPCs on the company's stock price we found that
there was still activity on Yahoo Finance's message boards. However, none of the companies in
our sample had any percentage of their stock owned by institutional investors which may show
that big investors stay away from companies issuing FPCs.
The main trend we observed was the amount of FPCs a company issued. Companies that
issued over 5 FPCs had negative stock returns from the first issuance of an FPC to the last. The
three companies in our sample that had positive returns, Terra Tech, DTS8 Coffee Company, and
Pocket Games Inc issued less than 5 FPCs. Discount and the amount of debt did not correlate
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with a trend because Terra Tech, DTS8, and Pocket Games Inc had discounts larger than the
mean.
Conclusion
Despite FPCs having a negative effect on a company's stock price, none of the
companies in our sample went bankrupt. It can be said that maybe the issuance of these FPCs
may have saved the various firms in our sample from imminent bankruptcy. Even though the
shareholders of the firms saw, on average, a -62.04% return, the companies still exist. It cannot
be concluded whether the companies in our sample will be around for much longer, but to our
surprise there were still investors actively talking on Yahoo Finance's conversation board about
the stocks in our sample. All in all, companies that issue FPCs must do so because they cannot
receive alternative financing. Despite the FPCs having negative effects on a company's stock
price, the funds can keep the company alive.
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